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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this hypothetical. Ten years ago, Apple, Inc. (AI), wishing to concentrate on its software business, decided to sell off its struggling Apple Music Division. The sale of the corporate division included physical and intangible assets, facility and personnel. AI found a willing purchaser (NewCo) for the division at a negotiated price. AI and NewCo entered into an asset sale and purchase agreement, together with a perpetual, exclusive, royalty-free trademark license agreement. The parties bargained for and agreed that AI would continue to use the trademark "Apple" in business outside the division, and NewCo has the right to use the trademark "Apple" in connection with the music products and services offered by the division. NewCo began the operation of the division after the acquisition. Things had been going very well for NewCo; it had expanded into the digital music world with many new "Apple" products and services.
Fast forward ten years. AI is now going through reorganization under bankruptcy law. AI seeks to terminate the exclusive trademark right used by NewCo in the music industry. AI will not compensate NewCo for the trademark right to use. The reversion of the exclusive right to use the trademark "Apple" in the music industry was never anticipated by either AI or NewCo at the time of the sale and purchase of the corporate division ten years ago. NewCo"s executives are furious as they are facing a business and legal nightmare. How can NewCo proceed with its business without the trademark right that it has been using to market and sell products in the last ten years? How can it be that the "perpetual and exclusive" right to use the trademark in connection with the marketing and sales of music products and services now has no meaning? NewCo"s bargained-for right to use the trademark faces elimination, even though it was never in breach of the trademark agreement.
Why does AI get two bites of the "Apple" trademark? Should AI be allowed to grant the right to use the trademark "perpetual and exclusive" with the sale of the music division and steal it back for free, ten years later? This article is part of an ongoing and broader inquiry into the intersection of trademark, contract and bankruptcy laws. This article argues that recent bankruptcy decisional law, notably the In re Exide Technologies decision, 1 misunderstands the "perpetual and exclusive" trademark transaction, deeming it as an ordinary "license" when it is truly an outright sale. This article explains that the "perpetual and exclusive" trademark transaction is a type of transaction that allows the seller to rid itself totally from a struggling division by selling all the property required for the operation of the division to a willing buyer. It is a transaction that permits the seller to divide up the trademark so the buyer can 1 .
In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). use the trademark forever with the acquired division and the seller can also use the trademark outside the division. This article also argues that the misunderstanding of corporate trademark transactions will lead to uncertainty, discouraging similar future transactions to occur. Companies will be reluctant to acquire a corporate division, along with the perpetual and exclusive right to use a trademark that is also the trademark used in the seller"s remaining businesses. The threat of termination of the trademark right when the seller is bankrupt some years later in the future will force potential acquirers to negotiate for much lower prices, to the detriment of the seller at the front end of the transaction. This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes trademark license arrangements that are typically utilized by the trademark owner to distribute and sell their products in the marketplace and not to sale an entire business unit to a purchaser. This type of trademark license arrangement is different from the uncommon transactions involving in essence a sale of trademark rights that accompany the sale of a corporate division to an unrelated company, as discussed in Part III. In this more uncommon transaction, the seller wants to sever ties with a particular corporate division while retaining the other divisions of the business. The seller sells the division to a purchaser, together with the grant of a perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free right to use the trademark in the operation of the corporate division.
Part IV examines the bankruptcy court decision, In re Exide Technologies, 2 where the transaction involving trademark rights, properly understood,fell within the type identified in Part III, the corporate sale of a business division together with the grant of right to use the trademark perpetually, exclusively and without further payment beyond the lump-sum purchase price of the corporate business division. That trademark transaction should have been held to be a sale, not as a typical license of merely the right to use. The Exide Technologies decision causes much uncertainty as potential purchasers may not be aware at the time of the acquisition that it may lose the perpetual and exclusive right to use the trademark in connection with the purchase of the corporate division. Why should a purchaser pay a large sum for all the assets, tangible and intangible, including the trademark right that it will not have in the future? Why should a purchaser pay for a property right that it later adds more value to through extensive advertising to be one of the best brands, if it will eventually be taken away without any compensation? Part V argues that the uncertainty must end, calling on the courts to recognize the reality and the substance of the corporate sale transactions of assets. If a grant of a perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free trademark right is an outright sale of the right to the trademark, the purchaser can continue to operate 2.
Id.
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[Vol. 44:1 the corporate division after the acquisition. This article suggests that, if bankruptcy courts adopt and follow In re Exide Technologies, the purchaser will have no other option to ensure certainty that its purchased business will not be destroyed other than to negotiate for a concurrent use of the same trademark with the seller by means of an assignment of the trademark right in specified fields of use. The trademark concurrent use doctrine allows two or more owners of the same trademark to operate in distinct territories. The doctrine has its drawbacks as two owners attempt to coexist, but allows the purchaser to keep the trademark out of the debtor seller"s bankrupt estate and alleviate the deadly reversion of the trademark right. This article concludes that the intersection of trademark and bankruptcy law has brought more uncertainty and unpredictability to the corporate sales of assets transactions. The damages suffered by the purchaser in the In re Exide Technologies 3 case serve as a reminder of a costly and chilling result of the uncertainty and unpredictability.
II. TRADEMARK IN LICENSES-TYPICAL, ORDINARY TRANSACTIONS
The owner of trademarks can exploit the commercial power of the trademarks by licensing the trademarks to others. A trademark license is generally a contractual agreement between the trademark holder and a third party to use the trademark in connection with certain goods or services and within a certain territory. 4 The licensee enjoys the right to use the trademark, while the owner continues to possess the title to and ownership in the trademark.
A trademark license agreement can be oral, but most are in writing. 5 A typical trademark license agreement contains provisions relating to the scope of the grant, quality control, duration of the license, royalty provision, best efforts of the licensee, registration, 6 and termination. 7 Trademark license agreements 3.
Id.

4.
Irene Calboli, The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 348 (2007) (noting that the trademark owner"s authorization by contracts to allow a third party to use the trademark is a trademark license); see also Jennifer T. Miller, Trademark Licensing, 928 PLI/PAT 423, 427 (2008) (stating that "[a] trademark license is a contract between the owner of a trademark (the "licensor") and a third party (the "licensee") permitting the licensee to make a specific, limited use of the trademark in commerce.").
5. Trademark license agreements often include a quality control provision to maintain the quality of the products or services bearing the licensed trademark. If the licensor fails to exercise quality control, the license arrangement may be viewed as "naked" licensing, and the licensor may face the risk of losing the trademark. 9 The trend in trademark licensing today with respect to quality control has changed, as courts have adopted a flexible approach that allows licensors to rely on the reputation and expertise of the licensees for the quality control of the trademarked products; the licensor is no longer directly involved in quality control.
10
Trademark licensors want to be compensated for the use of trademarks pursuant to the license arrangement. Trademark license agreements include royalty provisions detailing the methods of calculation and payment schedules. Running royalty payments are dependent on volume of sales, net sales, distribution, or production.
11 Licensees generally prefer the running royalty (BNA 2006 ) ("The reason for the trend towards flexibility is the practical reality that a licensing arrangement may entail some loss of control over product quality. But as long as the licensor maintains reasonable control over product quality, consumers ultimately do rely upon the licensor"s quality control. Consumers generally are oblivious to the corporate structure relating to trademark transfers or licenses.").
11. Here is an example of running royalty payment provision excerpted from Black 6 [Vol. 44:1 payments because they want to minimize the exposure of paying the licensor a large sum in advance. 12 From the licensor"s perspective, including a minimum royalty payment plan is a necessary protection. 13 Essentially, the licensor forces the licensee to use its best efforts and diligently exploit the licensee"s rights under the license agreement by requiring that the licensee pay a minimum fixed amount regardless of the volume of sales, production, or distribution of the trademarked products.
14 Additionally, the licensor will monitor and audit royalty payments, and to that end, the agreement typically includes provisions relating to record keeping, reporting, and audits. 15 Obviously, if the licensee fails to pay the required royalties, it is in breach of the license agreement. 16 Generally, a trademark license agreement will allow for a cure period. If a breach is not timely cured, the license agreement is subject to termination. 17 The termination provision may include a list of events deemed terminable. 18 When the licensee fails to perform its obligations such as lack of adherence to the quality control provision or breach of certain material 13. On the other hand, the licensees should "[a]void minimums if license is nonexclusive, and if minimums must be paid, then choosing minimum royalties over minimum sales might be preferable." Id.
14. For example, a "Best Efforts" provision imposes on the licensee that it "will proceed with diligence and will exert its best efforts in the exploitation, manufacture and sale of the licensed products, and in all ways and to the best of its ability will promote the sale of the licensed products throughout the licensed territory and supply the market therefor. provisions, it triggers the termination provision.
19
In summary, the devices used by trademark owners in their efforts to exploit their trademarks is the license or permission to third parties to limited use of the trademarks for a specific duration. The license agreement contains many provisions to protect the licensors as the owners of the trademark with a stake in the continued viability of the mark.
III. TRADEMARKS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
When a company, owning many divisions of its growing expansive business under common trademarks or house marks, 20 decides to unload a division of its business, it must determine how to structure the transaction including the intangible assets, such as the trademarks. 21 Generally, a potential purchaser of the division needs to acquire the perpetual and exclusive right to use the existing trademarks in the operation of the purchased division. This is so the purchaser can market, distribute and sell products and services while the seller company desires to keep its ownership in the trademarks for the continuation of the remaining divisions of its business. The company has several options to structure the transaction, depending on the circumstances.
22
For example, the company may want to provide the purchaser the right to use the trademark only within the division. 23 Accordingly, the company will insist on a license agreement with field of use restriction. 24 In some cases, where the trademarked products are confined within a particular territory, the company may furnish the purchaser the right to use the trademark in the specified territory. 25 That means, in addition to the Asset and Purchase Agreement, the seller will grant a license with a territorial restriction to the purchaser. PAT 199, 251 (2003) (noting that in an Asset Purchase, the seller and the buyer typically have two options: either the "Seller owns all of the intellectual property and grants a perpetual, irrevocable, paid-up, nonexclusive license in certain fields to the Buyer" or the "Buyer owns all of the intellectual property but Seller retains a perpetual, irrevocable, paid-up, royalty-free, nonexclusive license in certain fields.").
24. Thomas, supra note 16, at 518 (noting that the phrase "field of use refers to the territories and markets in which the mark can be used, while scope of use usually refers to the goods or services with which the mark will be used."). 
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Moreover, the seller may reserve the right to use the trademark on products or services outside of the field of use restriction, knowing that the seller has rights inside the geographical territory, as long as not within the field of use granted to the licensee. The potential purchaser, contemplating the acquisition, will plan to pay either a lump sum or a combination of a lump sum and contingent payments to acquire the assets of the corporate division from the company seller.
26
Spending significant financial resources to acquire the division, the purchaser obviously believes that the acquisition is a good business decision, and that it will turn the division into a profitable enterprise, yielding a nice return on its investment. To achieve those goals, the purchaser will negotiate for a price that will give it the right to the physical assets, manufacturing facility, key personnel, and intangible assets, 27 including the perpetual, exclusive trademark right to continue the operation of the division. 
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[Vol. 44:1 transaction, Dresser Industries granted the new Jeffrey Chain Company a perpetual, exclusive license to use the "Jeffrey" and "J" marks in the sale of non-plastic sewage chains. 32 Dresser Industries reserved "sole and exclusive ownership" in the trademarks "Jeffrey" and "J" in the remainder of its business while it agreed not to use the trademarks contrary to the license terms specified in the License Agreement. 33 After the acquisition, Jeffrey Chain used the "Jeffrey Chain" name on engineering class chains which included all types of metallic and plastic chains. 34 Seven years later, in 1992, Dresser Industries struggled with its remaining business and spun off its plastic sewage chain division and sold it to Indresco.
35
The sale of the plastic sewage chain division included an assignment of Dresser Industries" ownership interest in the "Jeffrey" and "J" trademarks. 36 Three years thereafter, in 1995, Tropodyne acquired Indresco Company. 37 From 1996 to 2004, Jeffrey Chain and Tropodyne engaged in trademark infringement and unfair competition disputes.
38
The Sixth Circuit held that the original transaction between Jeffrey Chain and Dresser Industries gave Jeffrey Chain the exclusive right to use the mark "Jeffrey" together with the word "Chain" in the non-plastic chain business, as well as the right to use "Jeffrey Chain" as a the name "Dresser" or any name implying that Buyer is associated with Dresser, or to use the name "Jeffrey" except when immediately followed by "Chain," as in Jeffrey Chain. . . . The use of the Jeffrey name and trademark is the subject of a license agreement . . . a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D hereto." Id. at 882 n.2.
32. The ancillary License Agreement provided in pertinent part: A. LICENSOR grants to LICENSEE the right to use the mark "Jeffrey," but only when coupled with the word "Chain," in its corporate or business name. B. LICENSOR hereby grants to LICENSEE the sole, perpetual, and exclusive right and license to manufacture, use, and sell metallic and non-metallic chains and parts and components thereof, other than plastic chains and chain parts and components to be used in the sewage industry, throughout the world under the trademarks "Jeffrey" and/or "J" as hereinabove described (herein, the LICENSED MARKS"), subject, however, to the following: (i) LICENSEE may use the LICENSED MARKS only when the LICENSED MARKS are associated with the word "Chain" ... Id. at 882 n.3.
33. "C. LICENSOR also expressly reserves the sole and exclusive ownership of the trademarks "Jeffrey" and "J" and LICENSEE agrees not to use the same except as specifically provided herein." Id. corporate name, and the right to expand its business in the plastic chain business, in addition to the right to use the corporate name in conjunction with the sales of plastic chain.
39
The Chain v. Tropodyne case demonstrates that, when an entire division of a business is sold, the purchaser acquires the physical assets and the perpetual and exclusive license to use the trademark so it can continue to operate and later expand the products and services as it desires. In fact, the purchaser Jeffrey Chain did expand its chain business after the acquisition, and also expanded the use of the trademark on new products. 40 The license in Chain v. Tropodyne is exclusive and that means only the purchaser Jeffrey Chain can use the trademark within the field. 41 Although the seller continued to possess legal ownership of the trademark in the remaining areas of its business, it could not use the trademark in the same field pursuant to the Asset Purchase and License Agreements. 42 Regardless of whether the seller continued to operate its remaining business or sold and assigned all of its rights, including the trademark rights, Jeffrey Chain was the only entity that had the sole right to use the trademark within the acquired division. The seller and its successors had already received the monetary sum for the sale of the assets of the division and could not go back to the purchaser to reclaim the trademark license. Consequently, the seller or its successors were not allowed to compete against Jeffrey Chain in the same market using the same trademark. If it did so, the seller or its successor would face trademark actions brought by Jeffrey Chain.
B. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Commissioner: Sale of Assets and Trademark Use Restricted to Field of Use and Geographical Territory
In Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer"s acquisition of a brewing plant together with the perpetual, exclusive license to use the trademark for alcoholic beverages within a limited geographical territory was not a "license," but a capital asset. 44 Therefore, the cost of the transaction was not deductable from income as a business expense. 45 In that case, the taxpayer Century Brewing Association ("taxpayer" or "Century") was a manufacturer of beer in Seattle, Washington. 46 The Seattle Brewing & Malting Company ("Rainier") was also in the same business in the 
12
Seattle area with its corporate headquarters in California. 47 The taxpayer and Rainer entered into an agreement entitled "Licensing Agreement," wherein Rainer sold its physical plant, property and equipment located in Seattle, together with the right to use the trademark "Rainier" in Washington and Alaska, in consideration for payments contingent on either a production basis or a minimum royalty. 48 Pursuant to the Agreement, Rainer agreed that it would not sell or distribute alcoholic beverages in Washington and Alaska. 49 The parties acknowledged that Rainier was the owner and would continue to have the sole and exclusive right to manufacture and distribute non-alcoholic beverages in the same territory under the same trademark.
50
The Agreement contained a provision wherein Rainier agreed to maintain all federal registrations of the trademark. 51 With respect to quality control, Century agreed that it would manufacture alcoholic beverages of the same quality as those manufactured and marketed by Rainier, and that the alcoholic beverages would be produced under the same formulae used and provided by Rainier.
52
Although Century acquired the title to the physical plant and real property from Rainier for the brewing business, Rainier demanded and Century agreed 47. Id. 48. Id. at 858. 49. Id. at 859 ("Rainier agrees that during the period of time this agreement remains in force, it will not manufacture, sell or distribute, within the territory herein described, directly or through or by any subsidiary company or instrumentality wholly owned or substantially controlled by it, beer, ale, or other alcoholic malt beverages, or directly or indirectly enter into competition with Century in said territory.").
50. Id. ("It is understood and agreed, however, that Rainier shall have the sole and exclusive right to manufacture, sell, and distribute non-alcoholic beverages within said territory under said trade names or brands of "RAINIER" and "TACOMA" and any and all other trade names or brands that it owns and desires to use.").
51. Id. (Rainier agrees that during the period of time this agreement remains in force it will maintain in full force and effect Federal registrations of said trade names or brands, "RAINIER" and "TACOMA" and will likewise maintain in full force and effect the present registration of said trade names or brands within the State of Washington and Territory of Alaska.").
52. The Quality Control provision pursuant to the Licensing Agreement is as follows:
Century agrees that any and all beer, ale, or other alcoholic malt beverages manufactured by it pursuant to this agreement and marketed under said trade names and brands of "RAINIER" and "TACOMA" shall at all times be of a quality at least equal to the quality of similar products then manufactured and marketed under said trade names and brands by rainier; and shall be manufactured under the same formulae used in the manufacture of similar products by Rainier, which formulae Rainier shall make available to Century. Id.
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to provide security for all of its ongoing obligations under the License Agreement.
53
To that end, the Agreement included a provision wherein Century agreed that if it was in default of any of its obligations, the title to the real property would pass to Rainier as liquidated damages. 54 Rainier and Century devised an elaborate royalty payment plan dependent on the alcoholic beverage production levels. 55 The parties also included a minimum annual royalty payment fee to ensure that Rainier would continue to receive a minimum sum, if Century failed to meet its own production and sales.
56 Century agreed to use its best efforts to increase the sales of alcoholic beverages within the territory and to expend advertising amounts to market the products.
57
In anticipating potential local prohibition laws on the manufacturing of alcohol, the Agreement also contained provisions to address how the minimum royalty payments would be adjusted accordingly.
58
In addition, the Agreement contained an option provision. 59 Pursuant to that provision, Century had the right and option to terminate all royalties by paying a sum of $1 million to Rainier, after the Agreement had been in force for five years from the original execution date. 60 After the acquisition, Century spent large sums on advertising the Rainier trademarked products in the territory. 61 Consequently, Century witnessed an increase in the production and sale of Rainier beer during the five-year period after the acquisition. 62 Century anticipated that the payments at the barrelage 63 Century executed a promissory note to pay Rainier the $1 million option price, together with interest. 64 The Tax Court treated the transaction as a sale, and the $1 million price as the cost of acquiring a capital asset. 65 Therefore, the cost was held not deductible from income as a business expense. 66 The case above represents another example of a corporate transaction wherein the seller is not operating a very profitable division and decides to sell the entire division to an unrelated company. The seller wants to continue to use the trademark outside of the specified field of use, alcoholic beverages, for its future business. The seller also wants to limit the use of the trademark to a defined territory. The acquirer desires to obtain the manufacturing plant, real property, and equipment, in addition to the right to use the trademark so it can continue production upon acquisition. The acquirer pays the agreed amount according to the payment plan, provides security for its obligations in the event of default, and uses its best efforts to produce and market the trademarked products. In fact, the acquirer aggressively operates and expands its advertising expenditures and sales of the products after the acquisition. The seller receives what it wants: monetary sums for its struggling business division, as it keeps its end of the bargain to restrain its trademark use in the specified territory. It continues ownership of the trademark and has the right to use the trademark in other fields of use. It maintains the federal trademark registration and receives $1 million when the acquirer exercises the option to purchase the business and ceases to pay royalties.
Both of the amounts paid, i.e., whether the acquisition cost is deductable as an expense or is a capital asset not deductable from the income earned during the year the expense was incurred. Another issue purchasers may confront is a breach of contract action involving the right to use the trademark, originally obtained from the seller, against the seller, its successors or licensees. These two types of events are foreseeable at the time the purchasers decide to spend a large sum to acquire the business division from the seller. What the purchasers cannot imagine is that the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark for the operation of the business division could be taken away at some unknown future time if the sellers, after the sale of the assets to the purchasers, continue to struggle financially file for bankruptcy.
IV. CORPORATE DIVISION SALE OF ASSETS AND TRADEMARK USE IN IN RE EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES
The unpredictability of the corporate transaction in which a purchaser has so willingly invested its resources to acquire the assets of the corporate division from a seller is seen in the following case, In re Exide Technologies. 71 In a nutshell, the purchaser paid millions of dollars to the seller in exchange for the entire corporate division of its industrial battery business, together with a perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free license to use the necessary trademark in the continuing operation of that business. 72 Over the course of a decade, the purchaser had turned the business into a profitable enterprise while the seller continued to face financial hardship with its remaining divisions. 73 When the seller filed bankruptcy, the purchaser confronted an unimaginable situation, losing the right to use the trademark in its purchased business because the seller was in bankruptcy and seeking to reject the trademark license and recapture what was sold to the purchaser, the right to use the trademark in the industrial battery business.
A. In re Exide Technologies
The Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware held that the debtorseller Exide Technologies could reject the license agreement with EnerSys, 70 . See, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222, 228 n.5 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (quoting the testimony of the purchaser EnerSys" President and CEO, Mr. John Craig for the description of the unexpected course of event wherein the debtor-in-possession decided to reject the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free license that was part of the corporate assets sale transaction from Exide to EnerSys: "Exide .. is trying to … steal back the Exide trademark and I don"t think that is fair.").
71 Ten years before Exide Technologies filed for bankruptcy, it decided to divest itself from the industrial battery business by selling the division to Yuasa, EnerSys" predecessor, for $135 million. 75 The
76
Upon the acquisition of the battery business, EnerSys devoted its expertise and significant resources to continue to build the industrial battery business for nine years more by making high quality products.
77
EnerSys became successful in establishing a strong presence for EXIDE industrial battery and claimed to be the "leading manufacturer of motive power batteries in the world."
78
Almost a decade after its divestment from the industrial battery business, Exide Technologies decided to reenter the business by terminating the noncompete agreement with EnerSys one year early. Exide Technologies sought to reject the perpetual and exclusive trademark agreement granted to EnerSys. 84 The bankruptcy court found that the trademark license was an executory contract because there were material and ongoing obligations remaining unperformed under the agreement. 85 The court then evaluated the agreement and held that Exide Technology"s rejection of it was an exercise of sound business judgment for the debtor"s reorganization effort.
86 EnerSys" right to use the trademark in the industrial battery business was extinguished upon rejection of the trademark license.
87
To support its conclusion that the trademark agreement was an executory contract, the court"s legal analysis proceeded with the familiar "Countryman standard." 88 Under that standard, the bankruptcy court stated that "a contract is executory when "the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other." " 89 The court noted that it looked at the "four corners" of the agreement to determine whether "both parties have unperformed material obligations" under the Agreement.
90
The court relied on the use restriction 91 and quality control 92 provisions of the trademark agreement which prohibited EnerSys from using the trademark outside of the industrial battery business and imposed on it the requirement to use the trademark in accordance with a quality control standard. the battery division. 98 Again, the provision was deemed by the bankruptcy court as imposing "ongoing, material obligations" on EnerSys. 99 In summary, with those material obligations identified by the court, the agreement is deemed an "executory contract." 100 Therefore, Exide could reject the agreement and EnerSys must stop using the trademark upon rejection.
A. Causing Uncertainties
At a first glance, the In re Exide Technologies decision seems unremarkable as one of those reported and unreported cases where license agreements involving various forms of intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, are either assumed or rejected by the debtor in bankruptcy. It is unremarkable since it addresses whether a license agreement is an executory contract and thus whether the debtor has the right to assume or reject the contract under the relevant statute. Court after court has routinely held, either with a cursory analysis or none at all, that patent, copyright, and trademark license agreements are executory contracts because both parties to the agreements have some unperformed obligations to fulfill. 102 
However, a careful examination of In re Exide Technologies
103 reveals a different picture. The agreement in Exide was not the typical, stand-alone, license agreement between a debtor and non-debtor party. The perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark in this case must be analyzed in connection with the outright sale and purchase of the industrial battery business division because the sale of the entire business included the trademark use right, 104 Unfortunately, the court ignored the reality underlying 
20
[Vol. 44:1 the inseparability of the sale of the battery division and the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark in the battery division. 105 The transaction was an outright sale of that portion of the trademark related to industrial batteries, not a mere stand-alone license.
106
By critically examining the transaction, it becomes apparent that the right to use the trademark in the present case was a property right sold to the acquirer as part of the entire industrial battery business. 107 The plain language of the right granted (exclusive, perpetual, and royalty-free) conveys the intention of an outright sale to the acquirer of a portion of the entire trademark.
108 Indeed, the reason that the right to use the trademark is perpetual is because the purchaser paid millions of dollars for the business, including the tangible and intangible property and rights, so it could continue to operate the business and generate profits from the acquisition. 109 The purchaser did not just acquire the perpetual right to use the trademark as a stand-alone transaction, and the seller did not grant the right to use the trademark to the purchaser as a typical, standalone license in the ordinary course of business. By granting a perpetual right to use the trademark to the purchaser, the seller knew that it was severing itself from a particular business so it could concentrate on the remainder of its businesses. The purchaser acquired the right to use the trademark forever so it could achieve certainty for its ongoing activity in the acquired business. The right to use the trademark is exclusive so the seller and its successors cannot compete directly against the purchaser within the defined market upon the acquisition of the business. The purchaser does not want to acquire the business from the seller for a very large sum and then have to face direct competition from the seller and its other non-exclusive licensees in the same fields of use and in the same geographical territory. 111 The purchaser"s chance to succeed with the acquired business may be dismal if it was forced to operate among competitors with the to use the trademark in the same field of use and geographic territory.
112
That competition would render the acquisition meaningless. The purchaser"s millions of dollars of investment in the acquisition would be wasted. The seller typically knows that payment for the transfer of the business represents the premium for the assets as well as the goodwill of that business with the exclusivity of the right to use the trademark in connection with the operation of the specific business. The purchaser negotiates and pays a price for the business and the exclusivity of the trademark in that operation in exchange for the certainty that no other entity beside it has the right to use the trademark. That certainty is important; the purchaser can prevent the seller and its successors from using the trademark in the field of use and in the territory. 113 The right to use the trademark is royalty-free because the purchase price for the business encompasses the price of the trademark right. Instead of a royalty payment plan, the purchaser paid a lump sum amount for all the property and rights, tangible and intangible, including the right to use the mark in the operation of the business. The trademark is not free; full consideration is paid as part of the purchase price of all of the assets of that business. The lump sum price in the In re Exide Technologies case reflected the seller"s mark in a designated territory is an assignment and not a mere license.").
111. Even in the typical, stand-alone trademark license arrangement, most licensees view exclusivity as a "critical term" because "[w]ithout [the exclusivity], it can be difficult to recover their investment in developing a market for the products, since others can sell the same product in their territory."). 
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[Vol. 44:1 wishes to withdraw from the industrial battery business altogether. 114 Also, the lump sum price established that Exide, at the time of the transaction, did not want to use the trademark again in connection with the industrial battery business. 115 The right to use the trademark was granted royalty-free because the value of the trademark usage was included in the purchase price of the business; thus, the seller and the purchaser could each go their separate ways in order to implement their own future business plans with certainty.
In contrast, in a typical, stand-alone trademark license agreement, a lump sum payment is not the usual term because licensors generally want to maximize the royalties by having those royalties dependent on net sales (often with guaranteed minimum payments), and by imposing a best efforts standards on the licensees to ensure the royalties" generation. 116 Paying for the total price, as EnerSys did in the In re Exide Technologies case, eliminated the periodic royalty payments dependent on production or minimum royalty payments, the maintenance of records for frequent audits conducted by the seller to verify the payments, or the enforcement of a best-efforts standard imposed on the licensee.
117
Most importantly, with the payment of the lump sum price, the purchaser attained a certainty which it would not have with a periodic royalty payment structure. In a royalty structure that demands a guaranteed minimum payment, the purchaser must make projections as to production, volume of sales, and expenses in order to arrive at an accurate number for the guaranteed minimum.
118 Also, in a royalty structure dependent on volume of sales or production, the purchaser must determine all the deductions so that it could arrive at a "net sales" amount for each royalty payment period. 119 The lumpsum price establishes the purchaser"s willingness to invest in the acquisition of 116. The lump sum payment feature is not included in the typical, stand-alone trademark license agreement which generally includes royalty payments dependent on production, sales volume, or a minimum royalty amount. Nye et. al, supra note 25, at 723-29 (explaining various types of royalties, timing of payments and audits to detect discrepancy between paid royalties and audit results).
117. Id. (comparing the licensor"s goals and the licensee"s goals under different issues related to royalty payment structures).
118. Id. at 727. 119. Id. ("Licensee will also want to make sure it has a clear understanding of what constitutes "net sales," and deduct those things that Licensee does not make any money on.").
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the business, as well as the purchaser"s strong desire to focus on the production and marketing of the products upon the acquisition. The purchaser has paid for the new business and is thus motivated to use all of its efforts to make the business competitive and successful. The purchaser is not bound by any best efforts provisions, and both the purchaser and the seller have no concerns as to whether the purchaser is using its best efforts in manufacturing, selling, and advertising the trademarked products. In summary, the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark at stake in the Exide Technologies case was part of the acquisition of the industrial battery business division. That right is property acquired by the purchaser, EnerSys, for the continuing operation of the industrial battery division, just as if Exide had sole EnerSys a physical manufacturing facility or equipment as part of the sale of the division"s assets. Those property rights should not be seized from the purchaser solely for the benefit of the sellerdebtor. The seller-debtor had already received its bargained-for-exchange in the form of the lump sum payment for all the assets of that division. The sellerdebtor desired to rid itself of the industrial battery business and found a purchaser who was willing to pay a large sum for the business. The transaction as a whole was an outright sale, severing the seller"s right to what it was sold by transferring it to the purchaser. When the seller filed bankruptcy, the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark in the battery division should not be considered to be part of the bankrupt estate and the executory contract provision of the Bankruptcy Code should not be used to reacquire those transferred property rights.
An acquirer like EnerSys would never have thought, at the time of the acquisition that it would lose the right to use the perpetual and exclusive right to use the trademark in connection with the business purchased. The acquirer generally would believe that it had negotiated and paid the purchase price for the entire property, tangible and intangible, including the perpetual and exclusive right to use the trademark necessary to operate the acquired business. EnerSys, like any acquirer in similar circumstances, naturally spent resources to manufacture, market and sell the products in connection with the trademark. If the acquirer knew that the perpetual and exclusive right to use the trademark was subject to reversion to the seller without any compensation, the acquirer would have factored the reversion into the price. Why should an acquirer pay much more for a property right if it will not possess it in the future? Why should an acquirer pay for something that later increases in value, but is then taken away without any compensation?
Likewise, a seller like Exide Technologies would never have imagined that after pocketing the lump sum for the sale of the corporate division along with the grant of a perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free right to use the trademark in connection with the manufacturing, marketing and sale of industrial batteries, it would have the right to take the trademark back. In fact, the seller Exide
24
Technologies knew very well that after the sale of the corporate division to EnerSys, it had no right to use the trademark in the same fields of use ever again. 120 Knowing the reality, ten years later Exide Technologies approached EnerSys several times with overtures to use the trademark, but EnerSys refused. 121 At the time of the transaction, if the seller knew that it would obtain the windfall right to use the trademark again, and the purchaser knew that it will stand to lose the perpetual, exclusive and royalty free right to use the trademark in connection with the industrial battery business, it is unfathomable that the seller would have been able to fetch the high price that it received for the sale of the division. The purchaser would not be so naïve to pay for something for which it would invest substantial efforts, in addition to the original sum, just to lose it all.
122
In re Exide Technologies 123 sends a chilling message to would-be acquirers that their investment in acquiring a business or corporate division might be wasted. At any given time in the future, the property negotiated and purchased for part of the acquisition might not be theirs to use in the operation of the business. Terms like "perpetual," "exclusive" and "royalty-free" become meaningless as the acquirer faces the enormous risk of losing the right to use a trademark or brand name in the acquired business when the seller files for bankruptcy. The uncertainty of the transaction conveyed in In re Exide Technologies and similar cases is paramount.
V. ENDING THE UNCERTAINTIES
A. Looking Beyond Form, Facing the Substance
By examining a trademark agreement granted in connection with the corporate acquisition of a business division as a typical, stand-alone trademark license agreement in the ordinary business of the trademark owner, courts focus erroneously on the form, not the substance and the reality of the asset sale and purchase transaction. 124 The proposed focus on substance requires the court to 120. In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. at 228 (noting that Exide Technologies could only use the trademark outside the industrial battery business).
121. Id. (stating that Exide re-entered the industrial battery business again, bought GNB Industrial Battery Company, had no right to use the EXIDE trademark, and made "several unsuccessful . . . overtures to EnerSys in attempts to regain the EXIDE mark.").
122. The price tag for the damages the purchaser EnerSys will incur has been estimated around $71 million. Id. at 245 n.35. The damages include the costs of switching to new brand, lost of investment, lost profit on lost sales, and lost price premium. Id. evaluate the operation of the provisions of the agreement to determine if they operate in a meaningful manner to place the attributes of ownership of the trademark rights transferred in the purchaser of the business. For example, in a stand-alone license transaction, courts would know that a quality control provision is critical because without such a provision the trademark holder risks abandonment of its trademark. In contrast, in the sale transaction of a business, which includes the perpetual, exclusive, and royaltyfree right to use the trademark in connection with that business, the "maintenance of quality" is "for the mutual benefit of the parties" and does not possess the same importance. 125 The purchaser, not the seller, will be the one who will care about quality control.
Similarly, "the agreement to protect the licensee against infringement" and other ongoing obligations of the agreement, such as the "restriction of trademark use" provision, the registration provision, and the termination provision "no longer existed in a real sense" in the perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free type of agreement in connection with the acquisition of the corporate division, as once the price is paid, the triggers for termination of the right to use the trademark can no longer be realistically invoked.
126
In a typical license arrangement, the "use grant" provision generally sets forth the scope of the grant so each party knows exactly the parameter of the field of use and territory. The use grant in the context of a corporate sale of a business division means something more: it establishes what the seller sells and executory contract as such is contemplated in the Bankruptcy Code.""). This substance over form approach is readily apparent in the legion of cases concerning whether a purported lease of personal property is a "true lease" or a disguised sale with a retained security interest. See Robert W. 125. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm"r, 6 T.C. 856, 868 (noting that the trademark license agreement with provisions "such as the maintenance of quality, advertising, and the purchase of malt" were "for the benefit of both parties, and the agreement to protect the licensee against infringement was no different than one to protect title. . . ., [p] rovisions for the mutual benefit of the parties became of relative minor importance" when the licensee paid the $1 million option price in lieu of the royalty payments). The Court held that the transaction was deemed a sale, not a license. Id. at 873.
126. Id. at 857-61 (identifying various ongoing obligations under the Trademark License Agreement between Rainer and Century); id. at 868 ("agreement to protect licensee against infringement was no different than one to protect title."). The Court noted that as soon as the price was fully paid, all the obligations "no longer existed in a real sense" and "became of relative minor importance" because the "most important provision in the contract was the payment of the price." Id. at 868.
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[Vol. 44:1 what the purchaser acquires with respect to trademark rights so the purchaser can continue to operate the business acquired and the seller may use the trademark in connection with its remaining business after the sale. This is akin to dividing one piece of property into two independent pieces of property, with the dividing line determined by the terms of the "use grant" provision. That means the seller should not be able to come back, whether on the day after the transaction or years later, to take the property of the purchaser, that is use the trademark contrary to the use grant provision. It has already sold that specified right of use to the purchaser. If a seller or its successor ignores the use grant, it might face a breach of contract action brought by the purchaser. Even in a trademark case where the facts are not as compelling as those in the In re Exide Technologies case, the court found in Shoney's Inc. v. Schoenbaum a breach of contract in favor of the exclusive licensee.
127
In Shoney's Inc. v. Schoenbaum, the licensor brought a declaratory judgment action against the licensee, seeking to determine whether the licensor could license the "Shoney"s" trademark for use in connection with motel services to a restaurant owner in the same geographic area. 128 The licensor had originally entered into a license agreement for the exclusive right to use the "Shoney"s" trademark for restaurant services. 129 The licensee countered with a breach of contract claim against the licensor because the licensor had licensed the same trademark to a different licensee for use in connection with different services in the same licensed territory. 130 The licensee asserted that the license agreement failed to reserve the licensor"s right to use and license the trademark for different purposes within the licensed territory. 131 The license agreement contained the following provision:
License and Licensed Territory. Licensor grants to licensee, for the terms and subject to the condition set forth herein, the exclusive right to use the Shoney"s System, Trade Names and Marks within the licensed territory as hereinafter described.
132
The district court held that under the above provision, the licensor granted to the licensee the exclusive right to the name Shoney"s in the territorial area and "that in turn prohibits the licensor from granting the use of the Shoney"s, or using the name themselves, in any other establishment in the [territorial] area. Thus, the licensee is assured that no other uses of the word will be made in the The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that such an interpretation "is supported in logic and by the traditional canons of statutory construction" because the language of the above provision literally grants to the licensee, with no express limitations, the exclusive and absolute right to use the trademark within the territorial area. 134 The Court of Appeals affirmed the breach of trademark license agreement claim asserted by the licensee against the licensor for licensing the same trademark to others for use in connection with other services, without reservations of such rights in the license agreement. 135 In some instances, the seller or its successor may face a trademark infringement or unfair competition action brought by the purchaser. 136 Indeed, in Chain v. Tropodyne, discussed above, the acquirer who purchased the engineering-grade chain corporate division from the seller, Dresser Industries, brought a trademark infringement and unfair competition claim against the seller"s successor, Tropodyne.
137
The use grant in the trademark license entered into in connection with the sale of assets in that case limited the purchaser to use the trademark only in the non-plastic sewage chains and the name "Jeffrey Chain" as its corporate name.
138
Under the use grant, the purchaser had no right to use the trademark outside of the defined scope and the seller could not use the trademark within the field of use, non-plastic sewage chains and the corporate name "Jeffrey Chain" for the engineering grade chain division. 139 The seller retained ownership and right to the trademark and could continue to use the trademark in other businesses outside the spin-off division.
140
The seller, Dresser Industries, did use the trademark in its remainder business for some time after the sale of the assets and then sold a 142 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Tropodyne could not prevent the purchaser from using the trademark in the field of use and that expanding its business was not in conflict with the license agreement between the original seller and Jeffrey Chain.
143
In summary, looking beyond form and focusing on the substance, the "license" of a trademark in sale of a business is in substance a sale of the trademark right in connection with that sale.
B. Sales, Not Licenses
There are examples of cases where courts examined the substance of the transactions and held that the transactions were sales of trademarks or other intellectual property and not mere licenses. For example, in Ste. Pierre Smirnoff, FLS., Inc. v. Hirsch, the court found that there was enough evidence to establish that the plaintiff became the owner of the name "Smirnoff" in the United States "by virtue of a purchase for a lump sum of the entire exclusive and irrevocable right in the business, good will of the business, and the name . . . ." 144 The court noted that other precedents supported its ruling that "the grant of an exclusive and irrevocable right to use a mark in a designated territory is an assignment and not a mere license." 145 III, is also instructive. 148 In that case, after the transaction with the Rainier Company, Century sought to deduct the $1 million option payments so it would not have to pay any royalties based on alcoholic production.
149
Century claimed that the $1 million were royalties because it did not receive full title and right to the trademarks and the payments were merely prepayments of future operating or production expenses. 150 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue rejected Century"s characterization of the $1 million payments. It contended that the taxpayer Century"s conversion of the Agreement from a royalty basis to a transaction under which it acquired exclusive and perpetual rights of a capital nature to manufacture and sell alcoholic beverages under the Rainer trademark; such cost may not be deducted as an expense.
151
The question for the Tax Court to decide was whether the $1 million should be regarded as an expense in the nature of prepaid royalties or a capital expenditure. 152 If it is a royalty expense, the taxpayer can deduct the amount in the year incurred. 153 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer acquired a capital asset when it exercised the option and paid the $1 million. 154 The Court explained that Century"s execution and delivery of the promissory note to Rainier eliminated the payment of royalties dependent on products sold and that the $1 million was in the consideration for the exclusive and perpetual use of the rights in the territory.
155
Since the transaction was a "capital transaction," the amount paid by the taxpayer is not deductible from income. 156 The Court proclaimed that "[w]e see no inhibition, where a corporation owns a trade name, to its assigning a right to use that name in a designated territory for a price, and if the right to use is perpetual and exclusive it is more consistent with the idea of a sale than a lease . . . ."
Under the logics of the above cases, the trademark transaction in In re Exide Technologies case was a sale, not a typical, ordinary license that Exide regularly engaged in to sell its products and expand its market reach. The perpetual, exclusive and royalty-free rights wherein all consideration was paid as part of a lump sum purchase price of an entire business was a sale of a property right. The perpetual and exclusive rights granted rendered the 148. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Comm"r, 6 T.C. 856, 856 (1946 If the bankruptcy court"s decisions continue to result in uncertainties by following the In re Exide Technologies ruling and reasoning, a potential acquirer of a corporate division has no other option but insist on an assignment of trademark right concerning the division. Alternatively, the acquirer can attempt to rely on the concurrent use doctrine in its negotiation with the seller for an assignment of trademark right in the specific field of use for the corporate division.
Concurrent Use Doctrine
Under the concurrent use doctrine, two different parties can own the same trademarks and agree to use the trademarks in two distinct, non-overlapping territories. 160 The doctrine had its roots in two early important cases before it became part of the Lanham Act, the federal trademark and unfair competition statute. 161 The "upon the ground that although the adoption of the Tea Rose mark by the latter antedated that of the Hanover Company, its only trade, so far as shown, was in territory north of the Ohio river, while the Hanover Company had adopted "Tea Rose" as its mark in perfect good faith, with no knowledge that anybody else was using or had used those words in such a connection, and during many years it had built up and extended its trade in the southeastern territory, comprising Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, so that in the flour trade in that territory the mark "Tea Rose" had come to mean the Hanover Company's flour, and nothing else." Id. at 411-12.
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Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.
163
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the plaintiff used the trademark "Tea Rose" in connection with its flour business in 1872 within the region encompassing Ohio and Pennsylvania. 164 The defendant began to use the same trademark "Tea Rose" on flour products in 1885 "in good faith without knowledge or notice" that the trademark had been adopted and used earlier by the plaintiff. 165 The plaintiff and the defendant operated their business and sales within their respective geographical territories without any consumer confusion problem until 1904, when the defendant decided to mount "a vigorous and expensive" campaign to advertise its products extensively outside its territory. 166 The defendant advertised in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia and Florida. 167 The defendant"s advertising campaign, however, did not reach the plaintiff"s market territory of Pennsylvania, Ohio and Massachusetts. 168 The parties were not aware of each other"s products and trademarks since their products neither overlapped nor were sold within the same market. 169 The Court observed that through the extensive advertising campaign the defendant"s Tea Rose Mill and Tea Rose flour products became known in the southern states. 170 The plaintiff, on the other hand, confined their use of the "Tea Rose" trademark to a limited geographical territory, "leaving the southeastern states untouched." 171 The Court ruled that since "Tea Rose" in the southern states meant the defendant"s flour products, the plaintiff could not assert trademark infringement against the defendant in that territory. 172 The Court reasoned that, to permit the plaintiff to use the trademark in the southern states, restricting the defendant"s use of the trademark would cause "the 163 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf created the "Tea Rose" standard for concurrent use, allowing two unrelated companies to own and use the same trademark in connection with different products in different geographical territories. 174 The Court recognized that trademark rights are established in markets where the trademark is known, but those rights do not extend to markets where the trademark holder"s products does not reach. 175 Two years later, the Supreme Court addressed United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., which contained similar facts to the "Tea Rose" trademark case. 176 In that case, the plaintiff Ellen M. Regis used the trademark Rex, a derivation of her surname, to sell medicinal products for cases of dyspepsia and other ailments.
177
The plaintiff registered her trademark in Massachusetts in 1898 and subsequently with the United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1900.
178
The plaintiff also established its trademark priority against a retail drug company, "Rexall," and then purchased the retail store in 1911. 179 At the time of the purchase, the retail drug company had its distribution and sales in the "Rexall stores" in various states, including four stores in Louisville, Kentucky.
180
In 1883, Theodore Rectanus of Louisville, familiarly known as "Rex," began to use the word as a trademark for a blood purifier medicinal preparation.
181 He advertised and sold his products without knowledge of the In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark in the same market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation settles the question. But where two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant; unless, at least, it appears that the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall the extension of his trade or the like.
Id.
175. Id. at 415-16 (framing the confine of the trademark right in "markets the use of a trademark has extended, or its meaning has become known, there will the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled to protection and redress. But this is not to say that the proprietor of a trademark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark signifies not his goods, but those of another.").
176 
2008/09] TRADEMARKS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 33
Regis" "Rex" products.
182
In 1906, Mr. Rectanus sold his business to a purchaser. 183 The new owner continued to use the "Rex" trademark to sell the blood purifier products in the Louisville area.
184
Almost seventeen years later, in 1912, the plaintiff Regis began to ship its "Rex" dyspepsia products to its Rexall stores. 185 Advertisements for the products were published by the stores in local newspapers. 186 However, prior to the advertisements, no customer in Kentucky had heard of the plaintiff"s Rex products. 187 The customer in Kentucky only knew "Rex" for the Rectanus company and their blood purifier product.
188
The Supreme Court observed that the successors of Mrs. Regis" company and Mr. Rectanus" store conducted their respective businesses using the same trademark on medicinal products in two distinct geographical territories for sixteen to seventeen years until the plaintiff brought the trademark suit.
189 Both parties had expended significant resources and efforts to build the goodwill of the trademark in their respective markets. 190 There was no bad faith to use the goodwill of the other party. 191 Consequently, the Court declined to grant an injunction against the defendant Rectanus company"s use of the trademark "Rex". To hold otherwise-to require Rectanus to retire from the field upon the entry of Mrs. Regis' successor-would be to establish the right of the latter as a right in gross, and to extend it to territory wholly remote from the furthest reach of the trade to which it was annexed, with the effect not merely of depriving Rectanus of the benefit of the good will resulting from his long-continued use of the mark in Louisville and vicinity, and his substantial expenditures in building up his trade, but of enabling petitioner to reap substantial benefit from the publicity that Rectanus has thus given to the mark in that locality, and of confusing if not misleading the public as to the origin of goods thereafter sold in Louisville under the Rex mark, for, in that market, until petitioner entered it, "Rex" meant the Rectanus product, not that of Regis.
Id.
193. Id. at 103.
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[Vol. 44:1 new rule that if a junior user has adopted a trademark in good faith and built the goodwill in the trademark in a particular market, the senior user cannot enter that market with the same trademark used first in other geographical markets.
194
The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine was later superseded by the Lanham Act which explicitly permits concurrent registration of multiple, similar trademarks.
195
Under the relevant statutory provision, registration for concurrent use trademarks are allowed if the parties can establish that they are entitled to use the trademarks based on "their concurrent lawful use in commerce" prior to the filing dates of the pending applications and as long as there is no confusion, mistake, or deception.
196 Concurrent use registrations may also be issued by the Trademark Office when a court has determined that one or more persons are entitled to use the same or similar trademarks in commerce. States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided, That if the Director determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to (1) the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter [.] 197. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (d) continues in relevant part: Use prior to the filing date of any pending application or a registration shall not be required when the owner of such application or registration consents to the grant of a concurrent registration to the applicant. Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons. 
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trademark for its ice cream and confectionery stores east of the Mississippi River, while Purple Cow Pancake House would own the trademark for restaurant services west of the Mississippi River. 199 The Board approved the agreement and allowed the concurrent use and registration to be granted to Meijer. 200 The Board reasoned that the agreement contained provisions which impose restrictions on the advertisements and displays of the trademark in the specific territory.
201
Any "spill over" advertisements into the registrant"s territory would carry a disclaimer of affiliation to the registrant, Purple Cow Pancake House. 
Co-existence Separately
The concurrent use doctrine allows more than one owner for the same trademark. Extending the concurrent use doctrine, the seller of a corporate division and the purchaser can enter into an agreement wherein the seller assigns all of its rights in the trademark in the field of use for the continuation of the corporate division while keeping the ownership of the same trademark in the other divisions of the business. With the agreement and assignment finalized, the purchaser can obtain federal registration of the trademark in the specific classes of goods and services in its own name.
The seller, however, may be reluctant to divide up its trademark into different fields of use. If the seller"s remaining business and the purchaser"s corporate division business approach closely to each other"s fields of use, the seller may not want to assign the trademark in a particular field of use to the purchaser for fear that consumer confusion may occur in the future. To minimize consumer confusion, the parties must advance with care to keep their businesses distinct and apart. In other words, the parties must learn to co-exist together while selling or offering to sell distinct products in different markets but in the same nationwide geographical territory.
Co-existence carries another risk that after the acquisition, either the purchaser or the seller may decide to manufacture and sell products of lower quality compared to those offered prior to the acquisition. Consequently, the
